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Abstract 
 
 This essay, and the special issue it introduces, seeks to explore leadership in a 
post-truth age, focusing in particular on the types of narratives and counter-narratives 
that characterize it and at times dominate it.  We first examine the factors that are 
often held responsible for the rise of post-truth in politics, including the rise of 
relativist and postmodernist ideas, dishonest leaders and bullshit artists, the digital 
revolution and social media, the 2008 economic crisis and collapse of public trust. We 
develop the idea that different historical periods are characterized by specific 
narrative ecologies which, by analogy to natural ecologies, can be viewed as spaces 
where different types of narrative and counter-narrative emerge, interact, compete, 
adapt, develop and die. We single out some of the dominant narrative types that 
characterize post-truth narrative ecologies and highlight the ability of language to ‘do 
things with words’ that support both the production of ‘fake news’ and a type of 
narcissistic leadership that thrive in these narrative ecologies. We then examine more 
widely leadership in post-truth politics focusing on the resurgence of populist and 
demagogical types along with the narratives that have made these types highly 
effective in our times. These include nostalgic narratives idealizing a fictional past 
and conspiracy theories aimed at arousing fears about a dangerous future. 
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The word ‘post-truth’ has become one of the most frequently used but least well 
defined memes of our time. There is little agreement on whether post-truth is 
something completely new or something that has always been with us. In the last few 
years, we have witnessed the emergence of political leaders and political campaigns 
that secured unexpected and resounding victories by relying on half-truths, lies, 
innuendoes and empty verbiage. These victories have given rise to the idea that we 
live in a post-truth era where truth does not have ultimate authority. What is more, it 
is argued that the boundaries between truth and lies, honesty and dishonesty, fiction 
and nonfiction have become blurred (Ball, 2017; d'Ancona, 2017; Davis, 2017; 
Keyes, 2016). 
The term post-truth was formally recognized and further popularized when the 
Oxford English Dictionary announced it as their word of the year in 2016, defining it 
as ‘circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public 
opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief’. However, this brief definition 
raises more questions than answers. Was there ever a time when appeal to emotion 
was less significant than objective facts? People have always invented myths and 
stories to bring meaning into their lives, and so too have leaders who use narratives 
and rhetoric to stir the emotions of their audiences. So can post-truth be seen as an 
entirely new phenomenon?   
Several commentators argue that even though certain features of post-truth 
were prefigured in earlier eras, a combination of different factors has shaped a new set 
of circumstances in our times which justify its designation as a post-truth era. Others 
are more skeptical, arguing that various elites, through the press and mass media, have 
always shaped public agendas by editing down, channeling, selecting or even 
censoring the stories that reach the public. As a journalist, Matt Taibbi puts it in his 
interview with Noam Chomsky: ‘It is like the parable of Kafka’s gatekeeper, guarding 
a door to the truth that was built just for you’ (Taibbi, 2018). Often performed in tacit 
collusion with powerful think tanks, lobbies or even the elected representatives, such 
strategies have been deployed to manufacture dissent about issues that are 
comparatively unimportant in order to prevent real dissent about issues that matter. 
The Brexit Referendum in the UK, for instance, may be seen not as a terrain for 
competition among alternative untruths, but as a vehicle for misplacing legitimate 
anxieties about rising inequalities and reduced opportunities into a meaningless slogan 
of taking ‘back control’. The slogan of taking back control became a proxy for 
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regaining a sovereignty that was never forfeited in the first place. This raises the 
question of our own role as academic knowledge producers and of our distinct 
contribution to such debates.  
As organizational scholars, we believe that a great deal is at stake, depending 
on our understanding of post-truth and the types of leadership it may spawn - for 
example, populist, irrational, inflammatory, confrontational, scapegoating and with 
scant respect for facts or the opinions of scientists and experts. If we lose all faith in 
facts and their appraisal, issues like climate change, migration, war and poverty are 
reduced to arenas of mere opinion (with everyone entitled to their own set of 
‘alternative facts’). The consequences may be far-reaching. Besides the debate on the 
novelty of post-truth, it is important to understand whether, why and how people 
respond to post-truth politics, distortions and other forms of misinformation and what, 
if anything, can be done about it.  
 The purpose of this special issue is to explore critically leadership in a post-
truth age, focusing in particular on the types of narratives and counter-narratives that 
characterize it and at times dominate it.  This introduction starts by examining the 
combination of factors that are often held responsible for the rise of post-truth in 
politics. We single out five broad categories of causes that feature consistently in 
commentaries on post-truth: epistemological changes (postmodernism), dishonest 
leaders and bullshit artists, digital revolution and information technology, economic 
crisis and collapse of public trust and, finally, human psychology. We then develop 
the idea that different historical periods are characterized by specific narrative 
ecologies which, by analogy to natural ecologies, can be viewed as spaces where 
different types of narrative and counter-narrative emerge, interact, compete, adapt, 
develop and die. We single out some of the dominant narrative types that characterize 
post-truth politics and highlight the ability of language to ‘do things with words’ that 
support both the production of ‘fake news’ and a type of narcissistic leadership that 
thrive in these narrative ecologies. We then examine more widely leadership in post-
truth politics focusing on the resurgence of populist and demagogical types along with 
the narratives that have made these types highly effective in our times.  
 
Post-truth: How did it come about? 
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Numerous factors have been linked to the rise of post-truth as a defining 
cultural and political phenomenon of our times. Many writers have traced the 
emergence of post-truth to the rise of relativism and postmodernism in the late 20th 
century (Gardner, 2011; D'Ancona, 2017) and the epistemological challenges they set 
for faith in absolute truths (including ‘scientific ones’) and objective facts. We are 
now more likely to hold contradictory views about the world and adopt relativistic 
opinions, in part due to increased contact with people from different cultures who 
hold vastly different views from our own. Postmodernism in academia has unveiled 
the role of power in sustaining different ‘regimes of truth’, often in discreet and 
invisible ways. But Mair (2017), and others, have argued that the spread of 
postmodernist ideas in the general publics has shaken people’s faith in objective facts 
and created a setting in which terms such as ‘alternative facts’ are legitimated. 
Postmodernism is held accountable for normalizing relativist views where lies can be 
excused as “alternative points of view” or “legitimate opinions”, because “it’s all 
relative” and “everyone has their own truth” (Pomerantsev, 2016). Postmodernist 
thinking gave voice to marginalized and powerless groups in society who were able to 
claim, with justification, that their experiences had been drowned by the established 
mainstream.  However, when deployed or highjacked by powerful elites 
postmodernist thinking has enabled them to challenge or dismiss inconvenient facts 
and theories, whether these concern climate change, migration or economic 
development.  
Furthermore, postmodern narratives can be exploited in another way by 
appropriating the rightful struggles of historically marginalized constituencies (e.g. 
women, people of colour, LGBT) to subtly undermine them while speaking in their 
name. In the political arena, this is manifested in the much derided identity politics. 
The backlash against the redressing of injustices, however modest, is associated with 
the neoliberal global elite project. This gives rise to illiberal populist forces across the 
Western world but more specifically in the USA and Eastern Europe (European 
Parliament, 2018). The concept of ‘gender ideology’ has become a metaphor and kind 
of social glue for expressing insecurity and unfairness produced by the current 
socioeconomic order (Grzebalska et al. 2017). Gender retrenchment is thus secured, 
paradoxically, through the wide dissemination of discourses of female freedom and by 
pretensions of equality (McRobbie, 2009: 55 cited in Fotaki & Harding, 2017: 24), 
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which is then often reversed and undone within popular culture. Graff (2016: 268) 
concludes that ‘The right-wing offensive against “gender” is no longer viewed as a 
polemic against gender studies, or indeed as a misunderstanding, but a new strategy 
on the right that transcends many divisions and contributes to the rise of illiberal 
populism.’ 
 Second, several commentators have pointed to what they see as qualitatively 
new levels of dishonesty and deceit on the part of political leaders. Some political 
leaders have always attempted to cover up the facts and manipulate their audiences. 
Today, leaders like Donald Trump in the US and Nigel Farage in the UK raise this to 
new depths.  They aggressively denounce some facts as fake, claim that there are 
‘alternative facts’ (Mair, 2017), attribute various nefarious conspiracies to 
‘establishment elites’ and dismiss genuine conspiracies as mere conspiracy theories. 
The success of post-truth politics is thus attributed to the rise of a ‘bullshit culture’ 
(Ball, 2017; Davis, 2017) that normalizes empty verbiage as a legitimate language 
trope in different settings, from business to political campaigns, dismissing any 
genuine difference between pundits’ claims and expert or ‘scientific’ assessments 
(Davis, 2017; Spicer, 2018). This argument is built on the work of Harry Frankfurt 
(2009) who claimed that bullshit is not necessarily created by mindless slobs, but can 
be the product of sophisticated craftsmen or bullshit artists. Such bullshitting can be 
calculated and carefully crafted - at times aided by advanced and demanding 
techniques of market research, public opinion polling, or psychological testing - but it 
is delivered in a way that gives the opposite impression. This allows the post-truth 
leaders or bullshit artists to resist calls for serious and austere discipline in 
distinguishing between facts and opinion (Frankfurt, 2009: 23). 
From this perspective, post-truth bullshitters hide the skill behind their work 
by demonstrating a laxity in their words, which deceive us about their enterprise. In 
doing so, bullshit artists seek to get away from the scrutiny that one experiences when 
one confronts lying. Frankfurt does not directly explain the reasons behind the appeal 
of bullshit or the rise of post-truth leaders who use it routinely. Nonetheless, one 
reason for the appeal of bullshit artists, such as Donald Trump, is that they seem to 
have earned a different perception of sincerity–at least among their supporters. Rather 
than being known as leaders whose credibility rests on telling the truth and providing 
accurate representations of the world, they convince their followers that they are 
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responding to their lived experiences and are offering honest solutions to their 
problems. As such, they establish their legitimacy by presenting themselves as 
‘strongmen’ who have the courage to speak their mind against invisible forces of 
censorship and suppression. Such, in their day, was also part of the appeal of fascist 
leaders such as Mussolini and Hitler. The blatant transgressions of bullshit artists 
from factual truth does not seem to harm their popularity which rests on the 
effectiveness of their storytelling. They have a gift of turning questions of facts into 
an argument (Ball, 2017) by invoking compelling narratives that play into their 
audiences’ fears and insecurities. As storytellers, bullshit artists make full use of the 
unique privilege of ‘poetic license’ that enables them to maintain an allegiance to the 
truthfulness of their story, even when it is blatantly at odds with factual evidence, 
scientific opinion or literal truth (Gabriel, 2004).  
Third, many writers attribute the breakdown of consensus about the truth to 
dramatic transformations in the structure and economy of information (Ball, 2017; 
d’Ancona, 2017; Mair, 2017), driven by new communication technologies (Gardner, 
2011). The development of digital communication tools and media has led to a 
dramatic expansion of available information conducive to an ‘information overload’ 
for the public (Knight & Tsoukas, 2018). The ease of publication and broadcast 
through digital channels has greatly increased our exposure to different sources of 
information and constant circulation of claims and counterclaims in the air. The 
digital revolution challenges the authority of traditional sources of information, such 
as mainstream media outlets, governmental offices and scientific research. Research 
shows that social media is quickly taking over mainstream media as the main source 
of news (Gottfried & Shearer, 2017), which could restrict people to a slant on the 
news shared in their own social circle or ‘social network bubble. The abundances of 
information has also led to the creation of a culture around the web which intensifies 
the popularity of brief, vivid, and memorable messages, as opposed to more complex 
and nuanced arguments (Gardner, 2011). Not only do we produce and consume these 
short messages, but we also contribute to their propagation by ‘liking’ them and 
recirculating them in social media. But the sheer amount of information means that 
many people do not have the time or interest to check their accuracy or provenance. 
While the content of some of these texts can be valuable, others are rumors, lies, 
unfounded conspiracy theories or simply gibberish. This may help explain the 
paradox that ‘the world seems to be getting less rational in an age of unprecedented 
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information and tools for sharing it’ (Pinker, 2018: 380).  
There can be few more appalling examples than the continuing phenomenon 
of Holocaust denial. Hayes (2017: 331) describes the Holocaust as ‘quite simply, one 
of the most amply documented events in world history.’ But the digital revolution has 
led to the creation of echo-chambers in which stories can go viral- and become ‘de-
facto’ facts by virtue of their widely shared status before anyone can verify or reject 
their factuality (Gardner, 2011; Maier, 2017). Holocaust deniers were among the 
earliest adopters of online platforms to spread their message. They argue, for 
example, that all evidence pointing to extermination camps is faked, that the gas 
chambers were built after the war for propaganda purposes, and that our 
understanding of the Holocaust is itself a Jewish conspiracy. A conspiracy theory is 
used to deny the existence of a real conspiracy with genocidal intent. Its purveyors are 
impervious to evidence, and rely instead on opinions based on the emotion of hatred. 
While there is continuing marginalization of irrationality within the discipline of 
organization studies and institutional theory (Vince, 2018) especially regarding the 
association of irrationality and affect (Fotaki et al., 2017), it would be erroneous to 
disregard the political dimensions driving such on line campaigns which are often 
connected to white supremacy organizations targeting civil rights won by women and 
race-equality movements (Daniels, 2009).   
Changes in the economy of information have also facilitated the dramatic, 
targeted and purposeful spread of fabricated information that mimics news media 
content in form but lacks accuracy and credibility (Lazer et al. 2018). In particular, 
the digital revolution propelled by new advertising opportunities has changed the 
landscape of information production and propagation (Ball, 2017). This has led to the 
emergence of myriad of fake news websites which mimic official news outlets, but 
spread false stories often driven by political agendas or financial interest. It has also 
shaped the business model of traditional media outlets by making click baits one of 
their major revenue streams.  This widespread proliferation of disinformation has 
made it even more difficult for the public to tell the truth from untruth and 
information from disinformation.  
 Fourth, many commentators have seen the rise in post-truth politics coincides 
with the resurgence of populist sentiments in many countries throughout the globe. 
These commentators argue that this is a symptom of the growing discontent among 
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the masses with the status quo (e.g. Coughlin, 2017) and the collapse of public trust in 
the political establishment and its dominant institutions. This collapse was partly 
caused by chronic economic decline and growing inequality in Europe and the US 
which undermined citizens’ faith in the neoliberal consensus and its economic and 
political institutions. The economic inequality is often maintained because those who 
have accumulated wealth are allowed to exercise significantly more influence in the 
political process than those without such resources (Fotaki & Prasad, 2015), thus 
eroding trust in public institutions and hollowing out democracy. For instance, 
campaign financing and lobbying in the American system demonstrates the corrupting 
influence of money in politics, which lead to regulatory failure (Lessig, 2011). Such 
phenomena were greatly exacerbated by the 2008 global financial crisis which left 
large sections of the population economically devastated and socially insecure. For 
many commentators this collapse of trust is the critical key to the rise of post-truth 
politics. While politicians have long been an object of suspicion in the public eye, the 
level of trust in public institutions has reached a new low in recent times (d’Ancona, 
2017). Findings from several studies show that as consequence the public trust in 
politicians, experts and the media has significantly declined in recent years (e.g. 
Mounk, 2018; Ball, 2017; Davis, 2017).  
Fifth, some commentators have viewed the success of post-truth politics as 
being ultimately due to the psychological needs of audience or followers (Mair, 2018; 
Lazer et al., 2018; Jaser, 2016). They argue that irrespective of technological, 
economical, epistemological and social changes which may have facilitated post-truth 
politics, it is human psychology which makes post-truth narratives appealing and 
enables people to discard scientific and other evidence when set against powerful 
emotional needs. This follows a long line of argument going back to Gustave Le Bon 
and Sigmund Freud stating that the masses “have never thirsted after truth. They 
demand illusions, and cannot do without them. They constantly give what is unreal 
precedence over what is real; they are almost as strongly influenced by what is untrue 
as by what is true. They have an evident tendency not to distinguish between the two” 
(Freud, 1921c/1985: 117). What may be distinct about our times is not the precedence 
of the unreal over the real, but the fragmentation of the unreal from the large-scale 
religious and political narratives of the past to various small-scale narratives which 
rage against each other and may temporarily gain prominence or popularity. The 
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breakdown of consensus about a single all-encompassing truth now lends credence to 
various psychological biases through which people confirm what they already believe 
rather than what challenges their views (confirmation bias) or enable them to ignore 
information that would disadvantage them (Mair, 2018; Lazer et al., 2018). People 
prefer information and sources of information that confirm their pre-existing attitudes 
(selective exposure) and are inclined to accept information that pleases them 
(desirability bias). Some studies also have discussed the impact of ‘backfire effect’ 
which can shield people when faced with information contradicting their beliefs (Ball, 
2017, 182-184).  
We now inhabit a society in which the social media have suddenly and 
dramatically become spaces where different narratives with their plots, characters, 
ambiguities and ramifications meet, spaces where distinctions between information, 
theory and story become easily blurred. This creates a fecund ground for the rise of 
post-truth as a legitimate parallel reality even when it comprises non-existent or 
entirely fabricated facts and events, such as president Trump’s claim about sunny 
weather or the size of the crowds during his inauguration (see Chan in Time, 2017). 
Post-truth may thus be seen not as the Oxford English Dictionary claims as 
‘circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion 
than appeals to emotion and personal belief’ but rather as a space in which public 
opinion itself dissolves into a variety of narratives, voices, sounds and noises 
competing for attention. This is the space that we seek to describe in the next section 
of this essay as a particular type of ‘narrative ecology’, a narrative ecology rife with 
elements like endless warnings of crisis and imminent catastrophe, images of 
ecological and social devastation allied to rampant consumerism and glamour, 
celebrity chatter and theatrics, conspiracy theories and an all-encompassing nostalgia 
for a golden past that is invariably seen as superior to an anxious present and a 
terrifying future.  
In concluding this section, we recognize that lies, disinformation and smears 
have a long history in politics and business but regard the concept of post-truth as 
offering some important possibilities for interrogating political and public narratives 
deployed by leaders in our times. Post-truth can be viewed as the result of an 
amalgam of different factors, some age-old and some very new, which are coalescing 
at this particular juncture in time. Its emergence may be the result of many pre-
conditions and enablers, some of which are engrained in human psychology and 
 10 
group dynamics, others are more specific the economic, social and political realities 
of our times which have paved the way for the rise of certain type of leaders. Taking 
advantage of currently available digital platforms, these leaders have been successful 
in disseminating different types of narratives, messages and ideas that have dislocated 
the notion of truth from the pedestal it has occupied in times past. 
 
Narrative ecologies for post truth times  
 
The concept of narrative ecology has been used to describe spaces where, by 
analogy to natural ecologies, different types and populations of narrative emerge, 
interact, fight, compete, adapt, develop and die (Gabriel, 2016). These narratives 
include stories, myths, ‘theories’, assumptions, archetypes, plot lines, characters, 
images, icons, symbols and other narrative elements along with the emotions and 
affects embedded in them. Narratives also include counter-narratives, in other words 
narratives that establish themselves in opposition to those that they cast as hegemonic 
or master narratives. Narratives and counter-narratives confront each other but also 
depend on each other for sustenance and virility, like different populations of species 
inhabiting the same eco-system. Like elements of natural eco-systems, narratives and 
counter-narratives are not constrained or limited by formal borders, national, cultural 
or organizational and can cross from one domain to another.   
As with natural eco-systems, different narrative eco-systems may display 
greater or lesser fragility, may contain greater or lesser diversity and may entail 
greater or lesser competition and conflict. Some narrative ecologies, like those of 
authoritarian systems and regimes, may be dominated by a single dominant narrative 
resembling a narrative monoculture which drives away other narratives as though they 
were undesirable parasites. Opponents become ‘traitors’ or ‘enemies of the people’, to 
be demonised rather than argued with. By contrast, narrative cultures in pluralist 
societies may accommodate a plurality of narratives with a wide range of characters 
and plot turns, occasionally taking notice of each other but rarely seeking to 
extinguish rival constructs. They may then be said to resemble narrative temperate 
zones where many species and populations find ways of existing and even thriving 
side by side. There are certain organizations, like those similar to the Weberian ideal-
type or organizations in the grip of extreme shock and trauma, where very few 
narratives may be observed at first sight. These can be said to resemble narrative 
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deserts where seasoned eyes can discern various narratives in diverse guises and 
shapes.  
Different historical periods, different social and cultural settings, different 
organizations can all be viewed as having distinct narrative ecologies in which 
contrasting narrative types appear, mutate, merge, cross-fertilize and interweave 
themselves with other narratives. These emerge from the material conditions of 
existence of different human groups but do not passively reflect these conditions. 
Some narrative types, like myths, can persist over centuries and millennia crossing 
many cultural and geographical boundaries while others may be found in very specific 
ecologies where conditions are suitable for them. Narratives from one narrative space 
can and do colonize other narrative spaces, they grow, they shrink and they 
sometimes die (for an example, see Foroughi & Al-Amoudi, 2019). 
Like other historical periods, post-truth is characterized by certain narrative 
types that dominate its cultural spaces. Most of these types have undoubtedly 
prospered on the back of social media and the technologies that favour their 
multiplication and proliferation. Indeed, the term ‘going viral’ dating back to the mid-
1990s captures accurately one of the key qualities of post-truth ecologies. Thus, the 
digital revolution has spawned new genres of narrative and micro-narrative (like the 
twit, the ‘share’, the comment, the ‘like’, the ‘friend’, the ‘follower’ etc.) and 
redefined some of the older ones (like ‘the unfolding story’, the ‘fake news’, the 
‘scandal’, the ‘crisis’, the ‘row’, the ‘voice’). Like other historical periods, post-truth 
is also characterized by some dominant narrative patterns and tropes, including its 
own myths, stories, images, slogans and buzz-words, which surface and often 
dominate public discourses. One of the characteristics of these patterns is their 
relatively short life-spans. In the days when the printed word was dominant, it was 
sometimes said that “yesterday’s news is today’s chip paper”. In today’s digital world, 
the vast majority of yesterday’s narratives vanish into the digital ethersphere, all the 
same leaving traces that may be resuscitated and even prosper at some point in the 
future. A few narratives or micro-narratives however, may go viral dominating for a 
period the ecosystem only to disappear after possibly having spawned other narratives 
or counter-narratives. Several authors have noted the exponential growth of ‘bullshit’ 
(Spicer, 2017; Davis, 2017; Ball, 2017; Frankfurt, 2005) in our time, bullshit being 
not just meaningless words but an unending stream of empty verbiage, hype, 
buzzwords, half-truths, platitudes, banalities, clichés, and outright lies which neither 
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speaker nor audience expect or demand that they should be representing reality in 
some accurate way. The growth of bullshit in our times, aided and abetted by the 
digital revolution, makes the narrative ecologies of post-truth akin to jungles where 
numerous species and types grow without plan or design and desperately compete for 
the light of publicity. In narrative jungles, particular narratives may grow in breadth 
and popularity suddenly (“going viral”) and then disappear just as suddenly, 
swallowed up by other narratives or by their own counter-narratives.  
A defining feature of post-truth politics is the resurgence of populism as a 
political phenomenon, accounting for the rise of diverse parties like the Five Star 
Movement in Italy, Podemos in Spain and the Sweden Democrats despite the last 
having well-established links to the former Nazi party in Sweden. Even more 
importantly, populism has been the driving force behind the unexpected triumphs of 
Donald Trump in the 2016 US Presidential election and of the Brexit camp in the 
UK’s referendum on membership of the European Union. The complexities and 
ambiguities of populism are currently widely discussed among political theorists 
(e.g.Mudde, 2014; Aslanidis, 2016; Brubaker, 2017; Schumacher and van 
Kersbergen, 2016; Pappas, 2014; Rosenthal, 2018; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 
2014; Stavrakakis, 2014; Stavrakakis et al., 2017), but “most scholars use populism as 
a set of ideas focused on an opposition between the people (good) and the elite 
(bad)”(Mudde, 2018).  
In his influential book, On populist reason, Laclau (2005) argued that 
populism is founded on a fundamental antagonism between the people (or the ‘nation’ 
or the ‘silent majority’) as the underdog which is oppressed by dominant elite (or 
oligarchy). This is often building on the existing economic inequality and/or unequal 
access to and a lack of representation in the political process. Different groups 
perceive their voices are not heard and their identities are marginalized. Two recent 
examples are the ‘left-behind’ populations in the wake of liberalized trade and global 
flows of goods, people and capital in the de-industrialized North of the UK and the 
Rust Belt of the US, voting in large numbers for Brexit and the President Trump 
respectively. 
Populism draws on these real issues to construct a narrative of the people, 
oppressed and exploited, but rising up against the corrupt elites. In most contemporary 
variants of populism, the fundamental antagonism between the people and the elites 
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extends to an antagonism between the natives set against various aliens, such as 
migrants and refugees, who are ‘othered’ as parasitical and undesirable (Gabriel, 
2008; Stokes and Gabriel, 2010). Such sentiments may arise from the displacement of 
anxieties resulting from decreasing opportunities for meaningful employment and a 
residual welfare state (Fotaki, 2019). They are then readily exploited by unscrupulous 
leaders to get elected with few intentions to solve these problems. What is key is the 
framing of debate by political leaders and their friendly media. McHugh-Dillon 
(2015) describes this relationship to explain the receiving populations’ attitudes 
towards refugees as bi-directional: while political narratives are heavily influenced by 
what politicians think the public feels about these issues, they also establish a 
backdrop against which public attitudes are formed. The language and virulent oratory 
that populist leaders often deploy in such instances- see, for example, David 
Cameron’s infamous reference to the swarms of people describing Syrian refugees of 
which the UK accepted just a handful of minors- may therefore contribute to 
radicalizing public attitudes (Fotaki, 2019).  
Drawing an inspiration from the notion language’s performativity (Austin, 
1962), Judith Butler (1990) has stressed the power of discourse to create the very 
realities it is meant to represent. According to Butler, we become subjects through 
performing social norms that circulating discourses convey since we do not exist 
outside these. This means that we are constituting, embedding and re-enacting ‘a 
truth’ (Fotaki & Harding, 2017: 47) of the discourse through ’performativity, which is 
not an act, nor a performance, but constantly repeated ‘‘acts’’ that reiterate norms’ 
(Butler, 1993:12). Butler uses the example of gender heteronormativity to explain 
how people become affectively attached to the dominant discourses because these 
provide them with a socially viable identity. While this often involves a subjection to 
a stark and often painful exercise of power (Kenny, 2010), we do so as we crave 
social recognition. Hence, we seek recognition through discourse and affective 
attachment to norms even if these misrepresent us (as is for instance the case of 
adopting heteronormative identities by gay people), which compels us to enact them 
so we can exist socially. In other words, performativity describes a set of processes 
that produce ontological effects, working to bring certain kinds of realities into being, 
and leading to certain kinds of socially-binding consequences (Butler 2010: 147).  
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This is important to develop an understanding of how post-truth works: by 
producing social norms and discourses that individuals or various groups affectively 
attach themselves to for obtaining viable social identities, even if these may be 
ultimately injurious to themselves. The adoption of an identity of the indignant and 
exploited people who give power to populist leaders that recognize their existence is 
bound to end in disappointment. But it could also have truly catastrophic 
consequences. The relatively recent European history should serves as warning for 
people who delegate power to populist leaders and yet these lessons seem to be 
forgotten perhaps because most of us no longer have a personal connection to these 
events (Stein, 2016). Indeed, narcissistic leaders around the world, including Jair 
Bolsonaro, Rodrigo Duterte, Boris Johnson, or Donald Trump to name but few, were 
all voted to the highest offices not despite but because of their narcissism. A culture of 
narcissism is a culture of echoes, where our ‘voices’ are just sounds merely 
reverberating off each other (Gabriel, 2014). And though leaders’ role in framing 
toxic discourses is important, leaders express and enable group’s inner desires acting 
as the ‘spinner of their dreams’ (Gabriel, 1999). Leadership and followership are 
bound by deep unconscious links (Burns, 1987) that cannot easily be separated. 
Narcissism and narcissistic leadership therefore is popular because it can be flexibly 
used and abused, responding to any projection, wish and desire with the metaphor of 
Narcissus capturing anything we like or dislike about ourselves and our culture 
(Gabriel, 2014). A narcissistic denial of reality deflects the citizens’ attention from a 
much needed social critique (Fotaki, 2014). Understanding how narcissism underpins 
policy making, and how it becomes increasingly prevalent in socially destructive 
ways of managing employees and manipulating the public, is therefore a necessary 
first step towards re-engaging with the political process (Fotaki, 2014).  
Populist counter-narratives 
 
In our times, populism, in its different guises, has emerged as a powerful 
counter-narrative to what it casts as the dominant narratives of the elites, such as 
globalization, multiculturalism, and so forth. In contrast to the open frontiers of neo-
liberal order, populist narratives seek to defend frontiers, physical, political and 
economic and reclaim control over movements of people, goods and cultures. 
Populism has been a major influence on the narrative ecologies of post-truth politics, 
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something reflected in the articles published in this special issue. The axiomatic 
dualism between ‘us’ and ‘them’, the irredeemable war between forces of good and 
those of darkness have become core elements of leaders’ narratives in our times. 
Insults, allegations, exaggerations and untruths of every kind become legitimate ways 
of bolstering the interests of ‘the people’ against the elites and the outsiders. This 
populist counter-narrative depends for its sustenance and vigour on having a dominant 
narrative to attack, a narrative ostensibly defended by the elites and their patsies, 
journalists, academics and pundits of every sort. A crucial aspect of the populist 
counter-narrative is that it claims to represent not just a silent majority, an entity 
invoked by Richard Nixon as ostensibly supporting his Vietnam policy (and 
rediscovered by Trump) but of a silenced majority, one that has been systematically 
ignored, gagged and rendered voiceless. Free speech has emerged as a core element of 
the populist narrative, regularly deployed as a justification for making various 
allegations and claims, including patently untruthful ones. Any attempt to silence 
opinion, for example as hate speech or as instigating violence, is seen as an 
infringement of the right to free speech which, at least in the US, is constitutionally 
protected.  
The extreme polarization into good and bad, friends and foes, that characterize 
post-truth narrative ecologies has tended to favour several types of narrative that rely 
on idealization, vilification and the simplification of complex and nuanced entities. It 
has thus favoured certain narratives that resist falsification and are in some ways self-
inoculating against direct attacks, which both find in post-truth a hospitable 
environment and come to dominate its narrative ecology. Two of those types of 
narrative are nostalgic narratives and conspiracy theories, both of which thrive in 
times of rapid change, uncertainty and confusion in different ways. It is hardly 
surprising to see a resurgence of nostalgic narratives in our uncertain and confusing 
times harking back to a 'golden age' of stability, order and comfortable prosperity. 
This can be the past of a nation, an organization, a group or an individual and may be 
constructed variously as heroic, romantic, happy, orderly, free, communal or even as 
harsh and difficult but always in such a way as to outshine a present which appears 
lacklustre, impoverished and lacking. The nostalgic past, the product of fantasy and 
myth, is highly idealized in such a way as to reflect the discontents and insecurities of 
the present.  
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The nostalgic past positively eschews any encounter with the past of historians 
that may steal its shine. In general, nostalgic narratives can be viewed as the flip side 
of the ideology of progress (Lasch, 1991). When faith in a better future wanes people 
are liable to experience nostalgia, which can then define the prevalent mood of a 
whole period. Thus, Boym (2001) argued that for Russia the twentieth century started 
with utopia and ended with nostalgia. In our times, nostalgia sustains entire empires 
of consumerist society, such as the heritage and tourist industries and a large part of 
the entertainment, film, music and the arts sectors where the word ‘traditional’ 
features as part of the sales pitch. Nostalgia has also fuelled an aggressive, 
xenophobic type of narrative that has assumed great prominence in our times, in 
which an idealized past of purity, authenticity, community, self-reliance and heroism 
confronts what it casts as the hegemonic narratives of late modernity – multi-
culturalism, diversity, cultural and sexual equality, intellectualism, urban 
sophistication and so forth. The chief aim of aggressive nostalgic narratives is to 
accentuate or exacerbate the discontents of today, by persistently maligning the 
present from the perspective of a mythical past.  
Aggressive nostalgic narratives are narratives that hinge on betrayal and fall. It 
is not surprising, therefore, that they often merge or cross-fertilize with another 
powerful post-truth narrative that focuses on betrayal and fall, conspiracy theories. 
Conspiracy theories may be par excellence the narrative of post-truth politics, 
combining iconoclasm with plausibility, fancy with factuality, absurdity with logic. 
Like nostalgic narratives, conspiracy theories relish their status as counter-narratives, 
relying on master narratives for their vitality and sustenance, seeking to puncture or 
debunk official accounts and to explain failure and loss by appealing to various 
invisible and dark but always purposeful forces. While conspiracy theories have long 
expressed paranoid anxieties and been associated with right wing ideologies 
(Hofstadter, 1966), in our times they have colonized large sections of the internet and 
can be found in every political colour from extreme left to extreme right. Populist 
leaders like Trump have embraced the narrative of conspiracy as one of their favourite 
genres. For example, he spearheaded the ‘birther’ conspiracy aimed at undermining 
the legitimacy of Barak Obama. But so too have many of their adversaries, for 
example, in seeking to account for Trump’s election and for the Brexit result. Casting 
somebody else’s argument or opinion as a conspiracy theory has become itself part of 
the narrative ecology of post-truth. In this way, we now have the strange situation 
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where climate scientists warning of global warming are accused of being conspiracy 
theorists by the very conspiracy theorists who deny climate change. There are several 
factors that make conspiracy theories powerful narratives in our times – one is their 
self-inoculating qualities. Debunking a conspiracy theory through appeal to material 
evidence or by exposing its internal absurdities and inconsistencies has become very 
difficult, and is more liable to be viewed as evidence of the power of the conspiracy 
(Aaronovitch, 2010; Oreskes and Conway, 2010; Basham, 2001). The effective 
deployment of conspiracy theories, like that of nostalgic narratives, has thus become a 
crucial feature of post-truth narrative ecologies and a potentially powerful instrument 
of leadership. 
 
Leadership narratives in post-truth times 
 
The articles included in this special issue offer a compelling picture of the 
ecologies that characterize leadership narratives in post-truth times. In particular, we 
have compelling evidence of narratives invoking dark forces and conspiracies that 
threaten ‘the people’ (Carsten, Bligh, Kohles & Lau, 2019) and the ways in which 
these are more of less effectively deployed and amplified through the social media 
(Auvinen, Sajasalo, Sintonen, Pekkala, Takala & Luoma-aho, 2019). Deye and 
Fairhurst ( 2019) demonstrate how these narratives simplify the complexities of our 
times, creating us-them, friend-foe dualities that favour populist forms of leadership, 
while Carsten et al. (2019) explore how and why leaders who deploy such narratives 
are naturally cast in heroic/charismatic ways by their followers. This is a response to 
the simplistic belief in a combative and belligerent individual who can be relied upon 
to defeat foes and cut through the complexities of social and political life with the 
aplomb of Alexander the Great cutting the Gordian knot.  
In the struggle against ‘the establishment’ and the corrupt elites, individuals 
seemingly untarnished by contact with power, like comedians and other celebrities but 
also business people, like Berlusconi and Trump, are liable to be swept to leadership 
positions, at least briefly, offering cynical irony as a means of taking on the elites 
(Milburn, 2019). Such leaders offer what are temporarily seen as effective counter-
narratives to the hegemonic narratives of the ‘establishment’, though a different type 
of counter-narrative is identified and analysed by Just and Muhr (2019). By exploring 
the narratives spawned by the Women’s March, these authors demonstrate eloquently 
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how a collectivist (as opposed to individualistic) and decidedly 
unheroic/uncharismatic set of leadership narratives can grow from the discontents of 
‘the people’, that cast the ‘strong man’ narratives as hegemonic.  Overall, then, the 
articles in this special issue suggest that populist leadership in post-truth times thrives 
by offering a counter-narrative to what it casts as the narrative of a corrupt elites, a 
narrative that casts the populist leader as one willing and able to defend the people 
against the conspiracies and betrayals of the establishment and various dark forces 
that threaten them. This counter-narrative assumes hegemonic status in some 
instances and may then be challenged by new counter-narratives like those of Occupy 
movements (Wall Street, London and elsewhere), the Women’s March and the 
People’s Vote March.  
Taken together, the papers that form this special issue raise a variety of 
fascinating insights into leadership in a post-truth era. They contrast with most 
leadership literature which remains relentlessly positive about the impact 
transformational, authentic or otherwise powerful leaders are said to have on the 
world. Some scholars have even suggested that leaders who depart from their 
idealized depiction of leadership are not really leaders at all (e.g. Bass and 
Steidlmeier, 1999). We disagree. Leadership can be a force for harm as well as good, 
and it is imperative that we develop a deeper understanding of how this occurs. 
Thus, the papers in this special issue draw attention to leadership behaviours that lie, 
deceive, misrepresent and distort, with a view to advancing sectional interests even as 
they often claim to do otherwise. Charisma is conventionally viewed by mainstream 
leadership scholars as a valuable means of positively influencing followers (e.g. Bass 
and Riggio, 2006). But it is also used to prey upon people’s fears, fantasies and 
grievances in order to undermine rational thought and respect for evidence. 
Researchers need to pay more attention to how charisma, the ability to offer a 
compelling vision and a skill for developing radical ideas can be deployed to 
undermine truth, empathy and rationality. 
We also need to consider what forms of leadership can effectively counter the 
post-truth narratives that have acquired such potency in our time. This must surely 
include a greater focus on how giving leaders – ‘strongmen’ – more power leads 
inexorably towards disappointed expectations and a contaminated body politic. How 
do we most effectively counter conspiracy theories? Do mainstream leadership 
theories need just a little tweaking in order to become part of the solution? Or are 
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radically new leadership discourses needed to move us forward? Human progress is 
not assured, and the environment in which post-truth narratives have taken hold poses 
many threats. It is our view that the study of leadership can offer at least some 
answers to all these problems. This requires a deeper commitment on the part of 
scholars to engage more seriously with real world problems, and perhaps to 
reconsider ideas that have had a hitherto totemic status within the academy. We 
publish this special issue as an invitation to consider these issues, a provocation to 
debate and as a contribution to make leadership studies part of the way forward rather 
than part of the problem.   
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